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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP TESTS FOR INCLUSION
OF LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS IN
DECEDENTS' GROSS ESTATES
INTRODUCTION
By the end of 1968 the population of the United States owned al-
most $1.2 trillion of life insurance.' In that same year, $6.1 billion was
paid to beneficiaries of policyholders who had died.2 This widespread
ownership of life insurance has resulted in over one-half of all the fed-
eral estate tax returns being filed with life insurance proceeds constitut-
ing part of the decedent's gross estate. 3 The Internal Revenue Code
specifically provides that the gross estate shall include the value of life
insurance proceeds receivable by the executor or the value of proceeds
payable to other beneficiaries under policies in which the decedent
possessed any of the incidents of ownership at the time of his death..4
Other provisions of the Code could also make the value of policy pro-
ceeds includible as: (1) property owned by the decedent at the time of
his death,5 (2) property transferred in contemplation of death 6 (3)
a transfer in which the decedent retained an interest for his life and
(4) a transfer to take effect at death.8 However, these other provisions
1 The Record for 1968, Life Association News, Feb., 1969, at 73.
Id.
3U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF
INCOME, FIDUCIARY, GIFT, AND ESTATE TAX RETURNS, at 70, 72 (1965). Latest
figures available show that out of 67,404 taxable estatae tax returns, 35,595
included life insurance proceeds in the gross estate.
4 1NT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2042, Proceeds of Life Insurance
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
(1) RECEIVABLE BY THE EXECUTOR.-TO the extent of the amount
receivable by the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the
decedent.
(2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER BENEFICIARIEs.-To the extent of the
amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies
on the life of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed
at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone
or in conjunction with any other person. For purposes of the preceding
sentence, the term "incident of ownership" includes a reversionary
interest (whether arising by the express terms of the policy or other
instrument or by operation of law) only if the value of such rever-
sionary interest exceeded 5 percent of the value of the policy imme-
diately before the death of the decedent. As used in this paragraph, the
term "reversionary interest" includes a possibility that the policy, or the
proceeds of the policy, may return to the decedent or his estate, or may
be subject to a power of disposition by him. The value of a reversionary
interest at any time shall be determined (without regard to the fact of
the decedent's death) by usual methods of valuation, including the use
of tables of mortality and actuarial principles, pursuant to regulations
prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate. In determining the value of
a possibility that the policy or proceeds thereof may be subject to a
power of disposition by the decedent, such possibility shall be valued as
if it were a possibility that such policy or proceeds may return to the
decedent or his estate.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2033.
6 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2035.
7 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2036.
8 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2037.
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are outside the scope of this article and are mentioned so as to point
out that section 2042 is not the sole means by which life insurance pro-
ceeds are includible in a decedent's gross estate.
Incidents of ownership has reference to one or more of the economic
benefits of the insurance policy and its meaning is not limited to owner-
ship of the policy in the technical legal sense. These benefits include
the power to change the beneficiary, the power to surrender or cancel
the policy, the power to make an assignment, the power to revoke an
assignment, the power to pledge the policy for a loan or to obtain from
the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the policyY There are
also other incidents recognized by the Regulations and the courts which
will be discussed at a later point.
It is the purpose of this article to examine the historical develop-
ment of the inclusion of life insurance proceeds in a decedent's gross
estate with regard to incidents of ownership and then examine the
present estate tax laws and the impact of recent court decisions which
may affect the estate planner in his use of life insurance as an estate
planning tool.
HISTORY OF LIFE INSURANCE IN ESTATE TAX
PRIOR TO 1954
The proceeds of a life insurance policy were first explicitly sub-
jected to estate taxation under the federal estate tax laws promulgated
by the Revenue Act of 1918.10 Prior legislation had made no provisions
for including the proceeds of a life insurance policy in a decedent's
gross estate.1 ' The 1918 Act provided for the inclusion of life insurance
proceeds for estate tax purposes when (1) the proceeds were received
by the decedent's estate or (2) proceeds in excess of $40,000 were re-
ceivable by other beneficiaries or (3) the policies were taken out by
the decedent upon his own life.
With regard to insurance proceeds payable to the decedent's estate,
there has been little change in the law with respect to the inclusion of
policy proceeds in the gross estate. While the 1918 Act required that
the insurance contract must have been taken out by the decedent upon
his own life, the 1942 Act 12 repealed this requirement and consequently
insurance payable to the decedent's estate is presently taxed if the
decedent is the named insured on the policy without regard to whether
he actually applied for the policy.
9 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2) (1958).10 Revenue Act of 1918, cl. 4, § 402(f), 40 U.S.C. 1098.
"ILewellyn v. Frick, 268 U.S. 238 (1925), held that proceeds of a life insurance
policy were not includible in a decedent's estate where a beneficiary had been
designated in the policy before the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1918.
12INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 811(g), as amended by the Revnue Act of 1942, ch.
619, § 404, 56 U.S.C. 798.
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Policy proceeds payable to beneficiaries other than the estate of
the insured presented some difficulties under the 1918 Act. For example,
there was the problem of the $40,000 exemption from the gross estate
being proportioned where the insurance proceeds arose from multiple
policies on the insured's life and were payable to two or more benefi-
ciaries neither of which was the estate of the insured. In such a case,
the exemption was proportioned among each policy payable to the bene-
ficiary by an exclusion ratio of the insurance which the individual
beneficiary was to receive over the total amount of insurance payable
to all such beneficiaries. A further twist was added when one of the
beneficiaries qualified as a charity. In such a situation the non-chari-
table beneficiary's policy received the entire exemption. 13
Another significant problem arose under the requirement that the
policy must have been taken out by the decedent upon his own life. This
would seem to connote that the decedent must have applied for the in-
surance and named himself as the insured. However, Treasury Regula-
tions issued subsequent to the 1918 Act were quick to expand the inter-
pretation to be given to this requirement. A 1919 Regulation1 4 promul-
gated 'the "payment of premiums test" by stating that the insured's
taking out a policy on his own life meant that he (the insured) had paid
the premiums on the policy. Technical application for the policy by the
insured was not to be the requirement. The Regulation contained the
qualification, however, that insurance proceeds payable to beneficiaries
other than the insured's estate were taxable to his estate only to the
extent that the insured had paid the premiums on the policy.
The life insurance proceeds inclusion problem took another turn in
1929 with the decision of the Supreme Court in Chase National Bank v.
United States.'5 In the Chase case, an insured had named his wife as
the beneficiary of three separate policies of life insurance. The proceeds
of these policies, minus the $40,000 exemption which existed at that
time, were included in the husband's gross estate for tax purposes. It
was argued by the husband's executor that the tax imposed on the life
insurance proceeds was unconstitutional because it was a direct tax and
therefore void under the apportionment precepts of the Constitution. 6
is In Commissioner v. Pupin's Estate, 107 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1939), the decedent
had taken out life insurance policies with $51,122.20 payable to his daughter
and $50,000 payable to a university. The estate tax return included in the gross
estate $61,122.20 of the life insurance as the total amount of life insurance in
excess of the $40,000 exemption and claimed a deduction from the gross estate
for the $50,000 payable to the university. The Court of Appeals held this to
be the correct application of the tax laws and in accord with Congressional
intent. See also McKelvy v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1936).
14 Treas. Reg. § 37 (1919).
'5 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
10 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 2, 9.
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In rejecting this argument the Supreme Court held that the statute 7
imposes a tax on transfers and consequently:
A power in the decedent to surrender and cancel the policies, to
pledge them as security for loans and the power to dispose of
them and their proceeds for his own benefit during his life which
subjects them to the control of a bankruptcy court for the benefit
of his creditors, (citations ommitted), and which may, under lo-
cal law applicable to parties here, subject them in part to the pay-
ment of his debts, (citations ommitted), is by no means the least
substantial of the legal incidents of ownership, and its termina-
tion at his death so as to free the beneficiaries of the policy from
the possibility of its exercise would seem to be no less a transfer
within the reach of the taxing power than a transfer affected in
other ways through death.' s
Shortly after the decision in Chase, a Treasury Regulation 19 based on
the holding of the case set forth the Treasury's position that in addition
to paying the premiums on the policy, the insured must have possessed
certain "incidents of ownership" in the policy before life insurance pro-
ceeds would be included in the gross estate of the insured.
The Treasury again modified its position in 1934 when it issued a
Regulation 20 which made payment of premiums and incidents of owner-
ship alternative tests to be applied in the determination of whether the
amount of the proceeds payable to beneficiaries other than the estate
were to be included in the insured's gross estate for tax purposes. These
alternative tests remained the standard until 1941 when the Treasury
adopted the payment of premiums test as the exclusive test for inclusion
of the amount of the proceeds of life insurance policies in the insured's
estate.
21
The test was again changed one year later, this time by statute, with
the passage of the Revenue Act of 1942.22 Under the Act, insurance
proceeds were again divided into two classes: (1) insurance payable
to the insured's estate and (2) insurance payable to beneficiaries other
than the estate. Unlike prior laws, however, the 1942 Act did not con-
tain the additional requirement that the insured must have taken out
the policy on his own life and the $40,000 exemption from inclusion
where insurance was payable to beneficiaries other than the decedent's
estate was eliminated.
Where the proceeds were payable to the insured's estate the test for
inclusion remained the same as in 1918 with the deletion of the require-
ment that the insured must have taken out the policy on his own life.
'7Supra note 10, as amended by the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 402(f),
42 U.S.C. 278.
18 Supra note 15, at 335.
19 Treas. Reg. § 70 (1929).
20 Treas. Reg. § 80 (1934).
21 T.D. 5032, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 427.
22 Supra note 12.
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Thus, the value of any life insurance payable to the estate on the death
of the insured was to be included in his gross estate. However, where
the proceeds were payable to beneficiaries other than the estate of the
insured, the Act adopted the alternative test of the 1934 Regulation.
This made the test of inclusion either (1) the insured paid the pre-
miums, directly or indirectly,23 for the insurance or (2) the insured
possessed incidents of ownership in the policy at the time of his death
which were exercisable either alone or in conjunction with another per-
son.24 If the insured possessed any incidents of ownership at his death,
the entire amount of proceeds were taxable regardless of who paid the
premiums.2 5 Also, if the insured had divested himself of all the inci-
dents of ownership during his lifetime but had continued to pay the
premiums the amount of the proceeds would again be included in his
gross estate. However, where the insured had paid only part of the
premiums and divested himself of all incidents of ownership, only the
proportion of the insurance which corresponded to premiums paid by
the insured was taxed in his estate. 2
6
LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS UNDER THE 1954 CODE
The provisions of the 1942 Act remained the law until the overhaul-
ing of the federal tax laws in the 1954 Code.2 7 Like prior laws, life
insurance was categorized for estate tax purposes into two classes: (1)
insurance payable to the insured's estate28 and (2) insurance payable
23 If the insured supplied some other person with funds to pay the premiums, the
premiums were treated as paid by the insured and not the nominal payor.
Clarence H. Loeb Estate, 29 T.C. 22 (1958), aff'd per curiamn, 261 F.2d 232
(2d Cir. 1958) ; Dunning v. Commissioner, 3 B.T.A. 1222 (1937) ; cf. Booth v.
Commissioner, 3 T.C. 605 (1944). See also Estate of Albert Dudley Saunders,
14 T.C. 534 (1950), where a wife applied for policies on life of her husband
and held all incidents of ownership, but under payment of premiums test, part
of the proceeds were included in the husband's estate because the wife could
not prove that she had paid all of the premiums.
'- As to incidents of ownership exercisable alone or in conjunction with another
person, see Goldstein v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 677 (Ct. Cl. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955).
25 Goldblatt v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 204 (1951).
26 Walker v. United States, 83 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1936) ; Helvering v. Reybine,
83 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1936).
27 INT. REV. CODE of 1954.
28 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(b) (1) (1958) provides:
It makes no difference whether or not the estate is specifically named
as the beneficiary under the terms of the policy. Thus, if under the
terms of an insurance policy the proceeds are receivable by another
beneficiary but are subject to an obligation, legally binding upon the
other beneficiary, to pay taxes, debts, or other charges enforceable
against the estate, then the amount of such proceeds required for the
payment in full (to the extent of the beneficiary's obligation) of such
taxes, debts, or other charges is includible in the gross estate. Similarly,
if the decedent purchased an insurance policy in favor or another person
or a corporation as collateral security for a loan or other accommoda-
tion, its proceeds are considered to be receivable for the benefit of the
estate.
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to beneficiaries other than the estate of the insured. 29 While the Code
retained the provisions that insurance payable to the insured's estate
was to be fully taxable without regard to the payment of premiums or
the possession of any incidents of ownership in the policy an important
change was made with respect to insurance proceeds payable to bene-
ficiaries other than the -insured's estate. For the estates of persons dying
after August 16, 1954, the incidents of ownership test was adopted as
the sole criterion for inclusion of the value of the proceeds of a life
insurance policy in the insured's estate.
The Regulations are careful to point out that incidents of ownership
include certain powers arising from the insurance policy itself20 This
emphasis on the power to affect certain changes or dispositions is a
crucial factor in determining whether the proceeds of a life insurance
policy are to be included in the insured's gross estate. It is therefore
important to distinguish between technical legal ownership of the policy
and legal rights or powers under the same policy since it is possible for
A to be the legal owner of the policy with certain rights or powers in
B, the insured, which would constitute incidents of ownership and thus
make the proceeds includible in B's gross estate upon his death.
In United States v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. 3 1 a father had
purchased an insurance policy in the amount of $50,000 naming his son
as the insured. The father named himself and his wife as beneficiaries
with the proceeds going to the survivor if one should predecease the
son. The father paid all of the premiums and retained custody of the
policy by keeping it in his safe deposit box. The policy contained the
provisions that the "insured" had the power to assign the policy, to
change the beneficiaries, and to surrender the policy for its cash surren-
der value. Thus, when the wife died, it was perfectly permissable for the
son to execute a change in beneficiary order naming his father as the
principal beneficiary. Approximately six years later the son died with
his father surviving him. The District Court 32 refused to hold that the
insurance proceeds were includible in the son's estate under section 2042.
In its decision, the court relied on certain acts of ownership exercised
29 State law will determine whether insurance proceeds are receivable by or for
the benefit of the decedent's estate or for the benefit of other beneficiaries.
For example, insurance payable to the insured's estate was not receivable by
the executor, but by his widow and children where local law makes any
insurance on a husband's life pass to his widow and children free from any
claims of the estate. Estate of Proutt v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 591 (6th
Cir. 1942); Webster v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1941).
30 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c) (2) (1958) provides:
Generally speaking, the term has reference to the right of the insured or
his estate to the economic benefits of the policy. Thus, it includes the
power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to
assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy for a
loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of
the policy, etc.31355 F2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966).
32241 F. Supp. 586 (D. R.I. 1965).
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by the father in that he had: (1) applied for and obtained the policy on
the life of his son, (2) paid all the premiums on the policy and (3) re-
tained physical custody of the policy by placing it in his safe deposit
box. The court then held that the son had not possessed any of the
requisite incidents of ownership in view of these facts although it was
aware of the recitals in the policy that the insured had the power to
assign the policy, to change the beneficiary, to pledge the policy for a
loan, and a further recital that if the designated beneficiaries did not
survive the insured the proceeds were payable to his estate. 33 In revers-
ing the Distirct Court, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that the powers to change the beneficiary, to assign the policy or to
pledge it for a loan were certainly within the intent of Congress in en-
acting section 2042.3
4
While the precise holding in Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. was
not entirely novel, it is significant in view of the court's discussion of
legal ownership of the policy. The court clearly indicated that while legal
ownership of the policy belongs to none other than the insured, the pro-
ceeds will be includible if he possessed any of the incidents of owner-
ship under the contract, "For decedent had some powers-perhaps not
33See note 4 supra. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c) (3) (1958) provides:
The term "incidents of ownership" also includes a reversionary interest
in the policy or its proceeds, whether arising by the express terms of the
policy or other instrument or by operation of law, but only if the value
of the reversionary interest immediately before the death of the decedent
exceeded 5 percent of the value of the policy. As used in this sub-
paragraph, the term "reversionary interest" includes a possibility that
the policy or its proceeds may return to the decedent or his estate and a
possibility that the policy or its proceeds may become subject to a power
of disposition by him.... The terms "reversionary interest" and "inci-
dents of ownership" do not include the possibility that the decedent
might receive a policy or its proceeds by inheritance through the estate
of another person, or as a surviving spouse under a statutory right of
election or a similar right.
See also Schultz v. United States, 140 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1944); Broderick v.
Keefe, 112 F.2d 293 (1st Cir. 1940), appeal dismissed, 311 U.S. 721 (1940);
Estate of Charles H. Thieriot, 7 T.C. 1119 (1946).
34 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1954) provides:
This section (2042) is a revision of section 811 (g) of the 1939 Code.
Under existing law, proceeds of insurance under a policy upon the life
of the decedent receivable by beneficiaries other than the executor are
includible in the decedent's gross estate in the proportion that the
amount of premiums or other consideration paid directly or indirectly
by the decedent bears to the total amount of the premiums paid for the
insurance. Under existing law, premiums paid by the decedent on or
before January 10, 1941, are excluded in applying the proportion men-
tioned if the decedent at no time after that date possessed any of the
incidents of ownership in the policy. This section revises existing law
so that payment of premiums is no longer a factor in determining the
taxability under this section of life insurance proceeds. Insurance pro-
ceeds payable to the executor will continue to be taxed as under existing
law. This section also requires the inclusion in the decedent's estate of
insurance proceeds receivable by all other beneficiaries under a policy
on the decedent's life with respect to which the decedent at death pos-
sessed any of the incidents of ownership exercisable either alone or in
conjunction with any other person.
[Vol. 54
LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS
rights, but powers-which could, if exercised alone or in conjunction
with another, affect the disposition of some or all of the proceeds of
the policy." 35 The decision distinguished between "intent facts", those
relating to the conduct and understanding of the father and his son,
and the "policy facts," those revealed by the insurance policy itself. It
was a direct consequence of the holding of the Supreme Court in Coin-
issioner v. Noels and indicated that lower federal courts were going
to follow the doctrine that policy facts were to control over the ex-
pressed or implied intentions of the insured and the legal owner of the
policy where the policy provisions were in conflict with such intentions.
Noel involved the question of whether certain flight insurance poli-
cies were to be included in the insured's gross estate. The insured had
applied for the policies at the airport and named his wife as the bene-
ficiary of each policy. The insured had directed the sales clerk to "give
them to my wife They are hers now, I no longer have anything to do
with them. 3 7 There was uncontradicted testimony that the wife had
paid the $2.50 premium on each policy and had retained the custody of
the policies upon delivery from the clerk. A short time after take-off
the husband was killed and the insurance claims on the policies were
paid to the wife. However, the proceeds of the policies were not in-
cluded in the husband's estate tax return filed by his executors.
In argument before the Supreme Court the executors' contention
was that Mrs. Noel was the owner of the policies and that her hus-
band had no exercisable incident of ownership in them at the time of
his death. In the Court's view, this contention rested on three alterna-
tive claims:
(1) that Mrs. Noel had purchased the policies and therefore owned
them;
(2) that even if her husband owned the policies, he gave them to
her, thereby depriving himself of powers to assign the policies or change
the beneficiary;
(3) even assuming the husband had contractual power to assign
the policies or make a change in the beneficiary, this power was illu-
sory since he could not possibly have exercised it in the interval between
take-off and the fatal crash.s
35 Supra note 31 at 11.
36 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
7 Id. at 679.
38 It is interesting to note that 4 years prior to the decision in Noel, Rev. Rul.
123, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 151 provided:
That a decedent at his death possessed an incident of ownership within
section 2042(2) in a flight insurance policy which he purchased at an air-
port. He had mailed the policy to his wife after filling in the beneficiary
designation. Even though he was unable to change the designation while
flying, he was given the right by the terms of the policy to change bene-
ficiaries. This was deemed sufficient to constitute an incident of owner-
ship.
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In answering these contentions and holding that the policy proceeds
should be included in Mr. Noel's gross estate the Court emphasized the
technical "policy facts" to be paramount over the "intent facts" of the
insured and his wife. The Court found that while Mrs. Noel may have
paid the premiums, the policies themselves gave the insured, Mr. Noel,
both the power and the right to assign the policies or to change the bene-
ficiaries. The exectors' contention that the policies had been assigned
to Mrs. Noel was also rejected based on a finding that the policies
could not be assigned without a written endorsement on the policy by
the insured. No such endorsement had been made and the power to
assign remained with the insured until his death.
The executors' third contention was particularly interesting in that
the Court recognized that the insured had had no opportunity to affect
changes in the policies3" and he had died within three hours of obtaining
the insurance. However, the Court answered this contention when it
said:
It would stretch the imagination to think that Congress intended
to measure estate tax liability by an individual's fluctuating, day-
by-day, hour-by-hour capacity to dispose of property which he
owns. We hold that estate tax liability for policies 'with respect
to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents
of ownership,' depends on a general, legal power to exercise own-
ership without regard to the owner's ability to exercise it at a
particular moment.40
The decision in Noel makes it clear that the Court was overruling
earlier decisions, notably Doerken,41 by lower courts which had held that
the intent of the parties is controlling and that where it clearly appeared
that the insured's intent was to transfer all rights under the policy such
intent would control over the wording of the policy giving the insured
any incidents of ownership. This contention had been followed by the
sixth Circuit as late as 1965 in Estate of Piggot.42 In that case the court
did adopt the reasoning of Doerken but held that on the facts there was
sufficient evidence to warrant a finding by the Tax Court that the dece-
dent had retained certain incidents of ownership in the policies insuring
his life.43 It is interesting to note the factual circumstances surrounding
39 Mrs. Noel retained custody of the policies at all times after delivery by the
clerk at the insurance counter. However, delivery of a policy to another does
not necessarily destroy the insured's right of ownership in the policy. Farwell
v. United States, 243 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1957) ; Fried v. Granger, 105 F. Supp.
564 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd per curiavn, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953).
40 Supra note 36, at 679. See also Nelson v. Commissioner, 101 F.2d 568 (8th
Cir. 1939), which held that the proceeds of life insurance policies were in-
cludible in the insured's estate even though exercise of ownership rights by
the insured was prevented by a pledge of the policies for a loan.
-1 Estate of Edward Doerkin, 46 B.T.A. 809 (1942).
42 Estate of Piggot v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1965).
43 See also Hall v. Wheeler, 174 F. Supp. 418 (S.D. Me. 1959) ; Estate of Michael
Collino, 25 T.C. 1026 (1956) recognizing the rule of Doerken but holding that
such intent had not been proved.
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Piggot and Doerken. In both cases life insurance policies were payable
to the respective insured's corporate employer which had paid all of the
premiums and there was proof in each case that it was the intent of the
parties that the respective corporations "owned" the respective policies.
While sufficient evidence was presented in Doerkin to exclude the pro-
ceeds from his gross estate and the burden of proof was noit met in
Piggot following Noel's introduction of the "policy fact rule" two fac-
tually similar cases reject the holding in Doerkin and the use of the
Doerken rationale in Piggot.
In Kearns v. Commissioner44 suit was brought to recover $6,900 in
estate taxes assessed on the proceeds of two life insurance policies.
Oscar Kearns had applied for th policies and named the family business
as the beneficiary of each. All of the premiums were paid by the cor-
poration and the policies were carried on the corporate books and finan-
cial statements as assets of the corporation. The corporation retained
the custody of the policies in the company vault, except for a period
when the policies had been assigned as collateral for loans. Under the
terms of the policies, certain rights and privileges were granted to Oscar
Kearns, including the right to change beneficiary, to exercise a conver-
sion privilege, to choose a method of utilizing the surrender value and
to elect a settlement option. The executors of Kearn's estate contended
that Kearns had assigned all his rights in the two policies to the cor-
poration, and that any incidents of ownership he retained were held by
him as a mere nominee of the corporation.
In holding that the proceeds of the policies were includible in Kearns'
gross estate, the Court of Claims relied on Noel's notion that "policy
facts" are not easily rebutted by reference to "intent facts" or external
circumstances. The policies in question provided that the insured, with-
out the consent of the beneficiary, may exercise every right and receive
every benefit reserved to the insured, or the owner of the policy. The
words "owner" and "insured" were used separately in the policy and
while the corporation had been designated as the owner, Kearns con-
tinued to refer to himself as the "insured." Since the insured's right to
assign the power to change the beneficiary had to be in writing, and no
such assignment had been made, the court concluded that Kearns had
retained at least one right under the policy, the power to change the
beneficiary," and thus possessed an incident of ownership within the
meaning of section 2042.
44399 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
45 The power to change the beneficiary is one of the most common incidents of
ownership possessed by an insured. Chase National Bank v. United States, 278
U.S. 327 (1929); Singer v. Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Seward
v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1947) ; Helvering v. Reybine, 83 F.2d
215 (2d Cir. 1936); Goldstein v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 677 (Ct. Cl.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955) ; Fried v. Granger, 105 F. Supp. 564(W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd per curlam, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953).
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The intent question was not resolved by Kearns, however, and the
question of corporate ownership versus retention of incidents of owner-
ship by an insured was again before the courts in Cockrill v. O'Hara.46
In this case the insured was president and sole stockholder of a corpora-
tion which was the beneficiary of three life insurance policies written on
the president's life. The corporation had paid all of the premiums and
apparently retained custody of the policies. The executors did not deny
that two of the policies listed the decedent as "owner" and that the
policies granted him such rights and powers as: (1) the power to
assign his rights in the policies, (2) the power to revoke any assignment
of the policies, (3) the power to change the beneficiaries, (4) the power
to change the form, kind, or plan of insurance, (5) the right to exercise
any one of several options with regard to the payment or use of divi-
dends, (6) the right to convert the policies to participating fully paid-
up whole life insurance or to endownments, (7) the power to borrow
the loan value of the policy, (8) the power to elect any one of several
options in the event of surrender or lapse of the policies, (9) the right
to elect the manner in which the benefits would be paid, and (10) the
power to revoke or change the election as to the manner in which the
beneficiaries would be paid.4 7 In spite of this impressive list of rights
and powers retained by Mr. Cockrill, his executors argued the intent
question raised in Doerken by claiming that there was a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the decedent possessed any incidents of
ownership in the policies at the time of his death. The court, relying
on Noel, 'stated:
The Supreme Court's summary rejection of clear evidence of
the decedent's intent in favor of the express terms of the insur-
ance contract can only be interpreted, in this court's opinion, as
a holding that so called "policy facts" (reservation of rights in
the policy) cannot be rebutted by reference to "intent facts" or
external circumstances. 4
With regard to the policy, it was undisputed that the incidents of
ownership in the policy, including the power to change the beneficiary,
were possessed from the date of the issuance of the policy by the dece-
dent's corporation. Based on this fact, the court held that the decedent,
as sole -stockholder of the company, possessed incidents of ownership
in the policy which he could exercise in conjunction with the company
and the proceeds of this policy, as well as those of the other two, were
includible in his gross estate under section 2042.4 9
4r 302 F. Supp. 1365 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
47 Id. at 1367.
48 Id. at 1369.
49 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c) (2) (1958) provides:
Similarly, the term [incidents of ownership] includes a power to change
the beneficiary reserved to a corporation of which the decedent is sole
stockholder.
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While Cockrill's implications are clear in the case of a one stock-
holder corporation, it did not suggest any limits of ownership that would
take a case out of the rule. For example, when a wife and children
own shares in a family corporation the husband would not technically
be a sole stockholder although he in fact exercises complete control
over corporate affairs. The Regulations do not define "sole stockholder"
and it is arguable that in a family owned corporation the husband might
exercise such control over the other stockholders as to be a sole for all
practical purposes. One court, in dicta, has given a partial answer to
this question.
While Landorf v. United States50 was primarily concerned with a
transfer in contemplation of death,5 1 the government had argued that by
reason of Mr. Landorf's stock ownership (50 per cent) and presidency
of the corporation he could have surrendered or cancelled the policy on
his life by acting together with the other 50 per cent stockholder. The
court stated that in cases of less than 100 per cent ownership while the
mere fact of stock ownership is insufficient to establish that the deceased
stockholder possessed an incident of ownership, it may be different if
it were proved that a particular stockholder had control over a sufficient
number of other stockholders to effectuate a change or cancellation at
his will.
TRUSTEED LIFE INSURANCE
Insurance policies may form the corpus of a trust in which case the
policy facts and the provisions of the trust instrument, including a will
in the case of a testamentary trust, will determine whether sufficient
incidents of ownership have been retained by the insured to make the
policy proceeds subject to inclusion in the insured's gross estate. Treas-
ury Regulations 2 make it clear that a decedent will be considered to
have an incident of ownership in trusteed insurance on his life if under
the terms of the policy the insured has the power, exercisable alone or
with another, to change the beneficial ownership of the policy or its
proceeds or the time or manner of enjoyment thereof. While the Regu-
lation is clear where the policy terms give the insured incidents of own-
ership, there is judicial precedent for finding that the insured retained
incidents of ownership where the trust instrument gives the insured
rights or powers.
50408 F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
51 Supra note 6.
52 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c) (4) (1958) provides:
A decedent is considered to have an 'incident of ownership' in an insur-
ance policy on his life held in trust if, under the terms of the policy,
the decedent (either alone or in conjunction with another person or
persons) has the power (as trustee or otherwise) to change the bene-
ficial ownership in the policy or its proceeds, or the time or manner or
enjoyment thereof, even though the decedent has no beneficial interest
in the trust.
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In Estate of Fruehauf,53 Mrs. Fruehauf had several life insurance
policies written on the life of her husband. Mrs. Fruehauf paid all of
the premiums on each of the policies until her death and by the express
provisions of each policy, the ownership and control of each policy were
to be possessed and exercisable solely by Mrs. Fruehauf, or her person-
al representatives, successors and assigns. 54 The residuary clause of
Mrs. Fruehauf's will created a trust with her husband as the benefi-
ciary.55 A later clause named her husband as a co-trustee of this trust
but at his death no distribution to the trust had been made by the co-
executors of the estate, one of whom was Harry Fruehauf.
Harry Fruehauf's estate tax return did not include the proceeds of
the insurance policies in question. It was the government's contention
that he had possessed incidents of ownership in the policies in that he
had the power as a co-trustee under his wife's will to do most of the
acts that the Regulations say will constitute incidents of ownership and
therefore the proceeds should have been included in the computation of
his gross estate. The majority of the Tax Court looked to the provisions
in the will giving broad powers to Harry Fruehauf when acting as and
with the co-trustees and co-executors to retain the policies for such
periods as they deemed advisable, to cause themselves to be designated
beneficiaries, to sell or assign the policies to Harry Fruehauf, for the
surrender value, to surrender any of the policies for its cash surrender
value, and to convert any policy into a paid-up policy of insurance.56
The court then concluded that the possession of such powers affecting
the beneficiary's enjoyment of the proceeds would be sufficient to con-
stitute the possession of "incidents of ownership" within the meaning of
section 2042.
Estate of AIyron Selznick57 is also relevant to the present discussion
although it was decided under the predecessor to section 2042.5 In
53 50 T.C. 915 (1968).
54 Id. at 916.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 916, 917. Mrs. Fruehauf's will provided:
Tenth: My Executors and my trustees may retain for such periods as
they determine advisable any insurance policies owned by me at my
death on the life of any other person, and pay the premiums on such
policies whenever they become due out of income and/or principal as
they shall see fit, and cause themselves to be designated as the benefi-
ciaries thereof, or they may, at any time, sell and assign any of such
policies to the person whose life is insured for the cash surrender value
thereof, or they may surrender any of such policies for their cash
surrender value, or they may, at any time, convert any of such policies
into paid up policies in whatever amounts may be provided by the terms
of such policies. With respect to any policies retained by them, they may
arrange for the automatic application of dividends in reduction of
premium payments and they may borrow on any of such policies, make
premium payments from the funds so derived, and repay such loans.
57 15 T.C. 716 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 195 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1952).
5 8 INT. REv. CoDE of 1939, § 811 (g).
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this case the decedent had placed certain policies in trust while retaining
a power to cancel these policies with a further proviso that he retained
the right to revoke the appointment of the trustee and name another to
take his place. Under the trust agreement ,the proceeds of the cancelled
policies were to be invested by the trustee with income payable to the
decedent. In concluding that the policies in the trust were includible in
his gross estate, the court emphasized that in addition to the previously
mentioned powers retained by the decedent he had -the right to direct
the trustee in the investment of trust corpus and held that the right to
receive income from such property was an incident of ownership pos-
sessed by him at his death so as to include the policy proceeds in his
gross estate.
Wile emphasis in Selznick was placed on the right to control of the
trustee, insurance proceeds have not been includible where there has
been merely a reservation of the right to give investment advice to the
trustee.59 Also, Estate of Carlton6" held that where the insured had the
right under the trust provisions to withhold his approval of sales and
investment of trust assets by the trustees the proceeds were not includ-
ible in his gross estate. The import of these cases lies in a determination
of whether the insured was given purely administrative powers to exer-
cise or whether he is given or has retained a power of control over the
insurance policies forming the corpus of the trust. In the later instance,
the tax consequences are clear while a factual demonstration of the
former will permit exclusion of the proceeds from the gross estate.
CONCLUSION
Policy facts giving rise to incidents of ownership are going to pre-
sent a significant problem for the estate planner who is going to make
effective use of life insurance as an estate planning tool, even though
the policy facts argument is not the only weapon in the Internal Reve-
nue Service arsenal for the inclusion of life insurance proceeds in a
decedent's gross estate.61 It seems clear from Noel and -the line of cases
following that decision that technical language in the policy giving rise
to what have been termed "policy facts" is going to overrule the "intent
facts" in the determination of life insurance inclusion under section 2042
although an exception to this principle exists in a case where the policy
59 Estate of Mudge, 27 T.C. 188 (1956) ; Estate of Wilson, 13 T.C. 869 (1949).
60 Estate of Carlton v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962).
61 In Cockrill one of the policies -was included in the gross estate of the insured
even though the policy was owned by a corporation and all incidents of owner-
ship were possessed by the corporation by virtue of the insured's 100 percent
ownership of the corporation. Also, in Prichard v. United States, 397 F.2d 60
(5th Cir. 1968), the court held that where a wife owned the policy and pos-
sessed all the incidents of ownership but made an assignment of the policy
insuring her husband as security for a loan obtained by her husband, the
husband obtained an economic benefit from the policy and the proceeds of
the policy were includible in his gross estate.
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does not reflect the instructions of the parties, as where an insurance
agent improperly fills out the policy form.62 While it may not always
be advisable to divest an insured of all incidents of ownership in a policy
from a practical standpoint, the estate planner should be alerted to the
possibility that insurance policies and trust instruments will unwittingly
make the proceeds of the insurance policy includible in the insured's
gross estate by virtue of the technical provisions contained therein.
MICHAEL W. FoRD
62 Estate of Bert L. Fuchs, 47 T.C. 199 (1966) ; National Metropolitan Bank v.
United States, 87 F. Supp. 773 (Ct. Cl. 1950) ; Schnogalla v. Hickey, 149 F.2d
687 (2d Cir. 1945).
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